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tive part might well have been extended. Taken as a whole, the bibliography is comparatively full, and as a list of titles it is a useful contribution to bibliographical studies of the period. It is unfortunate that all the important sources cited were not laid under contribution in the preparation of the narrative.

H. NELSON GAY.

A History of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century. By MARCUS R. P. DORMAN, M.A. Volume II. *The Campaigns of Wellington and the Policy of Castlereagh (1806–1825).* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, and Company; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company. 1904. Pp. xiv, 374.)

MR. DORMAN'S *History of the British Empire*, of which the second volume is now before us, has already won for itself a place of merit in historical literature. It aims to present a consecutive account of British foreign and domestic policy, claiming originality only so far as foreign relations are concerned. In the latter respect it is a contribution of substantial value, even in the presence of the writings of Fyffe and Rose, each of whom had access to the Foreign Office papers. Mr. Dorman has used the same documents with greater skill than did Fyffe in his *Modern Europe* and with greater fullness than did Rose in his *Life of Napoleon I*. For the period to 1825, which marks the close of Mr. Dorman's second volume, he has been able to interweave foreign and domestic policies in a more elaborate discussion than Stern was able to do in his *Geschichte Europas, 1815–1871*, and so to give a treatment of the period that is clearer and fresher than that of the German writer. The attitude assumed throughout is that of a fair-minded and impartial narrator.

Mr. Dorman pays little attention to affairs in France and central Europe. His point of view is always British and his desire is to elucidate the part played by British statesmen and soldiers in continental affairs. He is not writing a history of Europe in the nineteenth century. His work is, therefore, somewhat disproportionate and his handling of other subjects than his own largely conventional. Where he needs to fill in his picture, as he frequently does in the earlier portion, he draws on Rose and Napier for information, strangely enough neglecting entirely Oman's recent work, and occasionally, as in his discussion of the policy of Fox in 1806, he adopts not only Rose's sequence of ideas but even some of his words and phrases. Such a mild form of plagiarism seems unnecessary, since Mr. Dorman does not display in other portions of his history either slipshod scholarship or poverty of thought. He not only elaborates and improves existing accounts, but he introduces a considerable body of new information drawn from the correspondence of British representatives in other countries. He throws light on the Welcheren expedition (pp. 64–65); on the part played by General Chitroff in betraying information to the British government

(p. 93); on the negotiations between Alexander and Napoleon in 1811 (p. 104); and on the position of Prussia in February, 1812, regarding which neither Rose nor Seeley was sufficiently well informed (p. 121). It may be that Mr. Dorman has placed almost too implicit a trust in the accounts of the British ministers and that his work would be more scholarly if he had made a more critical comparison of the British and foreign reports. It is rather a striking fact that with the exception of Napoleon's *Correspondance*, Wellington's *Despatches*, Castlereagh's *Correspondence*, and the debates in Parliament, Mr. Dorman has made no use of other original material than the records in the British Foreign Office. He knows nothing of foreign archives or of foreign authorities. For this reason, his work, clear and readable as it is, has a certain appearance of insularity and incompleteness.

The second portion of the history, dealing with the period from 1815 to 1825, is chiefly concerned with the policy of Castlereagh. Mr. Dorman justly follows the present tendency to rehabilitate that statesman and to clear his name of the taint of reaction that has hitherto clung to it. He shows that Castlereagh did no more than uphold the best traditions of the British government. In the first place, Castlereagh consistently attempted to enforce treaties to the letter, and in so doing, particularly in the case of the alliance of November, 1815, was charged by the opposition in England at the time, and has been charged by many writers since that time, with joining a conspiracy to check the liberties of Europe. It is certainly true that Castlereagh had little faith in the power of the people to govern themselves wisely and peacefully, but many other men of that day, with the experiences of the French Revolution fresh in their minds, thought the same and deemed it no fit time for men in office to make experiments with popular government. Castlereagh did believe in constitutional government and therein differed wholly from Metternich, with whom he has been classed by careless writers. Probably his close identification with Metternich and the Metternichian policy has been due in part at least to his faith in the necessity of maintaining the continental alliances in order to keep the peace abroad and to assure moderation in the foreign and domestic policy of the continental governments. He labored hard to calm strong passions everywhere, and his loyal support of the duke of Richelieu in France was due to his hatred of the White Terror. Yet he opposed Alexander's project for a periodical meeting of the powers, since neither he nor the British government believed that treaties should be upheld by any such means.

In the second place, he refused to interfere with the domestic affairs of another nation, and he considered that every people should be free to conduct its own government as it liked, as long as it did not endanger thereby the peace of Europe. For this reason he refused to force the Bourbons on France in February, 1815; to coerce the king of the Netherlands when the freedom of the press seemed to be abused in that country; to interfere in Italy, at the time of the Neapolitan uprising; or

to prevent Austria from doing what she liked at Laibach, a refusal that drew down upon him the malediction of the liberals and won for him the approval of Metternich. On the question of the South American republics he made it clear, despite the endeavors of Spain and Portugal, that the British government would not agree to force the insurgent colonies to submit and that any coercion on the part of Spain would not be permitted. Canning in reality did little more, for it is evident from Castlereagh's statements that he fully expected the eventual independence of the colonies.

In passing judgment upon the statesmen of that time historical writers have drawn too sharp a line between Castlereagh and Canning on one side, and have failed to show the vital differences that existed between Castlereagh and Metternich and Wellington on the other. In fact, there are more points in common between Castlereagh and Canning than between Castlereagh and Wellington. Both were in favor of that "hardy annual", the Roman Catholic claims; both opposed parliamentary reforms but believed in constitutional government; and both upheld the cause of the South American republics. As a recent writer well puts it: "The difference between them was not one of principles but of character. Castlereagh was a bad speaker, but a man of sound judgment, cool and courageous, who combined suavity with strength. Canning was a man of fine and brilliant genius who looked at affairs 'with the excitable disposition of the poet and the orator'; and he had the orator's craving for popular applause." I am inclined to think that Mr. Dorman has not made some of his points with as much force and courage as would have been done by a writer with a firmer grasp of his subject and greater power as an analyzer of character; nevertheless, he has done a good work in upholding the right and in maintaining what he believes to be true. We shall look with interest for the appearance of further instalments of his history.

A few errors may be noted: the statement that Charles IV of Spain was "promised half the Portuguese colonies in return for Etruria" is not true (p. 33); Asturias led the revolt in 1808, not Galicia (p. 37); Beylen should be Baylen (p. 38); Kustrim should be Küstrin (p. 42); Robert Smith was Secretary of State in the United States in 1809, not "the confidential Minister of the President" (p. 86); the reference to Rose on page 185, note 2, should be to volume II, not volume XI; and on page 289, the memorandum drawn up for the use of Wellington at Verona after Castlereagh's death was drafted originally by Castlereagh himself for his own use and not by Canning as Mr. Dorman implies, since Canning wrote only that portion relating to the eastern question. The spellings Plesswig, Vitoria, and Plate are to say the least unusual, and Gourgand (p. 203) is certainly wrong. The colloquial form "Peninsular" used as a noun throughout this work is decidedly objectional.

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